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MARTIN J. ADELMAN: This session is US Patent Development. Really, if we
look at it, it's been 10 years since the America Invents Act was signed into law by
President Obama. You can look at that act in various ways. I looked at it primarily
as a mechanism for further reducing the role of juries in patent cases. There is a
lot of other stuff to confuse people as to what was really going on, but, in fact,
that was a primary function of the act. Now, since that time, there have been
strong attacks on the PTAB, which is the primary organ for dealing with patent
validity and taking cases away from the jury.
The jury, of course, already lost its small molecule litigation in the
Hatch-Waxman Act which is now almost 40 years old. Since most of those cases
don't involve damages, there's no right to a jury. Now, with the PTAB, there have
been several major attacks in the Supreme Court. We will get into what I believe
was the last major attack, and that's the Arthrex case. Now, we have to discuss all
of these developments. A great panel. I found that not everybody on the panel,
and let me just look at what I had to pull out. Not all the bios were actually in the
material that I found that listed all of the participants.
I did look. All you have to do for anybody who's not there is to go on
Google and you'll get the bio quickly. So I won't go through them, but we have a
very good panel. We've got Laura from Google, Carey from Quinn Emanuel,
Marjan from Allen & Overy and Nahoko from Lerner David. Nahoko, I think I've
known forever. I think it's pretty much forever, way back more than 20 years
which makes me feel old, but I'm delighted to see her on this panel. Now for our
key speaker, who's going to go, I assume, up to 25 minutes, and there's plenty to
cover, is Nicholas Groombridge. He's the gift, of course, from England to the
American Bar. He's great, and he's great fun. He's got a huge team always
working for him involved in all kinds of great patent litigation. I'm going to turn
this over now to Nick.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: Marty, thank you for the kind words.
I'm conscious of the fact that I'm stepping into some big shoes here because
Dimitrios Drivas has anchored this spot for a lot of years.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Forever.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: Forever. Yes. Right.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Forever. I was wondering, so you're now
stepping in. This is tough.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: It is tough.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: He always took 25 minutes, never 26.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: Exactly.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Never 24. 25.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: So here we go. Right. I certainly
follow in Dimitrios' lead. I will talk about cases. Before we do that, I wanted to
step back a little and look at the very big picture. We were very fortunate this
morning to hear, as part of the conference, the first public speech by the new
director, Director Vidal. It was in many ways fitting because we're, I think, at an
inflection point. I'm sure we'll get into this.
But we are undoubtedly living in interesting times in the patent world.
And we had something else that was touched on this morning, an editorial in the
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New York Times. Just a few days ago, by the editorial board no less of the New
York Times, articulating the premise that the US patent system is broken. I can't
remember ever having seen such a thing. It, to me, was very interesting.
Let me throw out the idea that we may be at an inflection point in which
the biggest single driver for changes in the patent system has been these many
years the rise of the non-practicing entity, leading to, for example, the AIA, and
that maybe we're now at a place where, if that's not being replaced, it's at least
being overtaken as a driver by drug pricing as the major motive force that's going
to affect the patent system.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Nick, I don't want to step on your thought, but I
remember in 1964, Kefauver practically running for president on an extreme
anti-patent platform. It may be that when I listen to you, I say, "Oh, boy, do I feel
old," because this is really old. He thinks this is new. There isn't a new idea in this
whole article. It is brainless, and I will go through it. It's exactly what you expect
from the brainless New York Times.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: I'm going to take issue with you a little
bit on that, Marty, that some of the things that are in that article seem to me to
make eminent good sense. One of the things they say is enforcing existing
standards, giving the patent office more resources. They call out that statistic that
we've heard that the average patent application gets a grand total of 19 hours of
examiner time before it emerges as a patent. That is a very good point to me,
right? There are many things in there that I would totally agree with you, make no
sense.
The underlying premise seems to be driven by the idea that the patent
system is the reason why drug prices are high. It talks about insulin, and there was
a statement. I made a note of this. They're talking about what I take to be
evergreening where they say that pharmaceutical companies may get a patent on
quote, "making a tablet instead of a pill." I don't even know what that means. It
talks certain things that, for example, capping the number of times a rejected
application can be resubmitted, which I take to be a reference to some sort of limit
on continuation practice.
That seems to be an idea that is gaining traction. Making it easier to
challenge patents before they are granted. Marty, you will remember, decades
past, how the US IP community was furious with countries that had pre-grant
opposition, how that was a major bone of contention between the US and Japan.
This seems like it's a suggestion, an idea that's gaining currency. Let's have what
is in effect pre-grant opposition.
There's a lot of things in there that have history and also a lot of things
where it seems like the patent system is being used as an object of blame for
perceived social ills that really have much more complex causes. I'm sure we'll
get into it. One of the things that I did want to flag is that they promote the
legislation that Senator Leahy had introduced to restore the American Invents Act,
which seems as though it was largely intended to undo many of the measures that
the Director Iancu had put in place, for example, eliminating discretionary
denials. Let's come back to that.
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They talk about patents thicketing. One thing, I had thought there was a
chance we might be speaking at this conference about the decision from the
antitrust case that's pending in the Seventh Circuit, in which one of the two issues
is whether amassing too many patents is in itself an antitrust violation, or it can be
an antitrust violation. A case involving the biologic product HUMIRA, and that's
been pending now. The oral argument was about 14 months ago and still pending.
But the idea, for example, that we've come to a place where simply having
too many patents, even if you don't assert them, is some sort of violation of law is
to me, also an indication of where we are. Director Vidal mentioned the FDA
letter which was from last September, a letter from FDA to the USPTO, which
takes issue with continuation practice, takes issue with patent thickets, so-called,
takes issue with evergreening saying, and I was shocked to see this in that letter
that, a change from a drug that has to be administered twice a day to make it
administered only once a day is in some way inappropriate for patent protection.
Asking whether the PTAB could be made more effective as a means to
support generic market entry. All of those things seem like they're driven-They're all steps that would work directionally to weaken the patent system. I
think that's in many ways where we are. There's a lot going on. It's all
unidirectional. Our colleagues from other countries should probably be aware of
that. But with that, I will talk now in the spirit of Dimitrios, let's turn to case law
and go through some of other things that have happened, starting with the
Supreme court and the Minerva versus Hologic decision on the doctrine of
assignor estoppel, which is the idea in US law that someone who sells patent
rights for valuable consideration cannot later be heard to challenge the validity of
those patent rights.
This is a doctrine that has existed in US patent law for many decades. The
Supreme Court took it up in a case in which they were asked to either abolish it or
declare that it had been abolished long back. The court heard policy arguments
saying that in the modern world, it was a bad idea to prohibit those who had
invented something, sold it, and then moved on to their next gig from being able
to challenge the validity of patents that they had sold or of arguments about serial
innovation, the spirit of Silicon Valley, how common it was for people to start a
company, sell it along with the IP, and then move on to do something similar but
different and how that would spawn this type of situation.
The court in its decision, majority opinion by Justice Kagan declined to
abolish the doctrine but did weaken it in some significant ways. Perhaps with a
nod to the policy arguments that have been made, said that an employee
agreement to assign inventions not yet made cannot be the basis of a subsequent
assignor estoppel argument. Also carved out a couple of other exceptions, notably,
where what has been sold is that, an application that is then subject to being
broadened in later continuation practice. The court said that where the would-be
patent challenger could show that the claims are materially broader than the
doctrine prohibiting a validity challenge would not apply.
Let me move on to a perennial favorite, section 101, where what I see
going on there is the judicial system still now several years into our 101
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adventure. This is patent eligibility. What type of subject matter qualifies to be
patented under US law?
The courts are still trying, perhaps struggling, to come up with a uniform
set of rules about how we can apply, how we can know what is eligible for
patenting and what is not eligible for patenting. I wanted to call out two cases,
which to me, highlight the difficulty we face in this area of the law as it-- It does
move forward, it does develop but fitfully and with a lot of challenges. These are
both cases on patents that involved, broadly speaking, remote authentication
techniques, technology for establishing that someone who was wanting to engage
in a transaction, say from a mobile phone, was indeed a legitimate actor.
Both cases where the patent was held in the trial court to be invalid for
lack of eligibility. Then when they went up to the Federal Circuit, in one case the
Federal Circuit reversed that and upheld the patent. In the other case, it affirmed
the district court and said, this patent is not eligible. The first case is CosmoKey
solutions versus Duo Security. The issue was this idea of how to know whether
someone who's attempting to make a transaction on a mobile phone is a legitimate
actor.
The trial court, the District of Delaware, had invalidated the patent citing
prior Federal Circuit decisions to the effect that this idea of authentication is an
abstract idea and therefore fails step one of the so-called Alice test and
particularly appointed to an earlier Federal Circuit case called Prism.
Interestingly, I think here, the Federal Circuit in the CosmoKey case said, well,
looking at prior cases is all well and good, but you shouldn't do it too much, and
you have to be very careful with it.
That to me is important because if I'm a trial court judge and I'm trying to
understand what I can and can't do, I would've thought that I could go to this now
growing body of Federal Circuit cases and look at them for guidance. In
CosmoKey, the court seems to be saying, you could do that at your peril. Here the
court casts doubt on whether this idea of authentication is necessarily abstract but
then jumps forward to step two and says “We don't need to answer the step one
question because this is clearly an innovation at step two of the Alice test.”
It, in some respects, sidesteps the potentially tricky problem of having to
address their own prior precedent, upholds the patent, Judge Reyna dissents and
says, the sidestep is not a good idea here and it makes the whole analysis
questionable and it will inject doubt into the law here. Now, the second case I
wanted to contrast is Personal Web versus Google, again, about essentially
authentication technology. Here the court endorsed again, patent was struck down
in the trial court, and got to the Federal Circuit. Federal circuit does exactly what
in the CosmoKey case, it had called into doubt. It looks at its own prior cases and
says, boy, this seems very similar to one of our prior cases. It's an abstract idea.
It also looks at real-world bricks and mortar examples and says that what
you've got here is really just a computer-implemented method of doing something
that, say, librarians have been doing since time immemorial, and there's really
nothing more to this and strikes down the patent. I think if you look at these, it
highlights the challenge that we've got taking these two together for predictability
as we try to come to a place where practitioners can advise clients about what is
5
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eligible and what's not and trial court judges can rule with some confidence that
they know the principles that are to be followed. That’s interesting. That's still
moving along.
I'm going to move on now to written description and enablement. In
enablement, the big news is that the Supreme Court, just on Monday, granted or
issued a so-called CVSG order in a long-running case Amgen versus Sanofi,
which has been the subject of this panel at this conference in prior years. Again,
this is a situation where Amgen had a patent. It sued Sanofi. The case went to trial
twice. Two separate juries’ rule in Amgen's favor. Twice that was overturned by
the Federal Circuit.
The question really here is in the context of biotechnology claims, and
specifically monoclonal antibody claims, to what extent can broad functional
claims be permitted? What are the rules that govern their enablement of those
claims? Amgen, having lost in the Federal Circuit, filed a petition for certiorari on
two questions. The first was whether enablement is a matter of law for a court, or
a matter of fact to be decided by a jury. Going back to Marty's opening remarks,
Amgen argues that the Federal Circuit has gone wrong by making it a matter of
law.
Secondly, Amgen argues that the Federal Circuit has mis developed the
law of enablement to say that in order to determine whether undue
experimentation is required, Amgen's characterization of the Federal Circuit is
that the circuit has focused on the cumulative effort that would be required to
practice the entire scope of that which is claimed, in essence. The broader the
claim, the more the cumulative effort is, and the less likely it is to be enabled.
Amgen argues that's wrong. It is simply necessary that the patent applicant teach
some ways to practice the invention.
Amgen argues that old Supreme Court cases, one from the 19th century
and one from the early 20th century foreclosed the law as it's been articulated by
the Federal Circuit.
The significance of the so-called CVSG is that statistically the chance of
the Supreme Court taking a case is very low. Even in so-called represented cases,
it's only about 3% of them that get granted, but where they call for the views of
the government by this CVSG procedure, that percentage jumps to about 50%.
Now it's a coin toss as to whether they will take this case, and if they do take it,
presumably it's because they want to change the law of enablement.
Moving along, let me also talk about written descriptions. There is a, to
me, significant case called Biogen versus Mylan that really, in some ways, is the
capstone of a long-running change in the law of written description or series of
changes going where it would have been decades ago. US law, that in order to
determine whether it was written description or what would've been called in
those days support for a claim, you look at the specification and see whether you
can find in the specification that which was later on incorporated into the claim.
This is a case where the key question was whether it's a method of
treatment. The question is whether the specification provides support for using
about 480 milligrams or a dose of 480 milligrams of the drug in question where
the specification includes an express disclosure that one of the effective ranges is
6
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from about 480 milligrams to about 720 milligrams per day. We have that exact
phraseology in the specification. Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court decision saying that there was no written description of this
invention because it was too speculative.
Notably, they pointed to the fact that there was only one place in the
specification where this number, 480 milligrams, appeared and said that because it
was one end of a range that detracted from subsequent claim limited to this
dosage. I think what this is, it really is a convenient summary of how written
description law has evolved to a point where even though everything that's recited
in the claim is present ipsissima verba in the specification, the court is looking
beyond that, including here looking to extrinsic evidence to say, "Yes, but we
don't think that you had actually invented that with you later claimed."
I should say there was a vigorous dissent by Judge O'Malley in that case
and remained to be seen whether there will be further proceedings there. I'm
going to touch on another written description case, which is Juno versus Kite, also
about a technology case involving the technology often referred to as CAR T a
form of immuno-oncology in which the patient's T cells are extracted and then
genetically reprogrammed to attack cancer using portions of antibodies, what's
called a single chain of variable fragment, or scFv.
Again, in this case, there was a jury trial. There was a very large damages
award, about $780 million. Interestingly, a 27.6% running royalty awarded. All of
that got overturned in the Federal Circuit on the basis that the two patents failed to
provide written description because they did not spell out structurally what these
antibody-like fragments would consist of and they provided no correlation
between structure and function. Therefore, there was a failure of written
description. Another case that illustrates the trend, I would say, towards making it
very difficult to obtain broad generic coverage, particularly in the life sciences
area.
I will move on touch just briefly on another case, an obviousness case
about secondary considerations and specifically nexus. This is Teva versus Eli
Lilly. Again, interesting in this case, Teva, which was the patent holder had sold
products that embodied the claims. However, the patents in question were
invalidated in an IPR proceeding, and that was subsequently affirmed by the
Federal Circuit.
Addressing secondary considerations, the court again, it showed its
distaste for broad structural claims, particularly in the life sciences area saying
because the claims were broad and lacked structural elements, that meant that
there was no nexus, that the effectiveness of these embodying products depended
for example, on their binding affinity, their specific amino acid sequences, things
of that nature, and because none of those specifics were in the claim, there was no
nexus, even though the products were covered.
Again, I think, illustrative of an antipathy towards broad structural claims.
We touched briefly on damages. You heard Paul Michelle this morning says that
his view that the Federal Circuit had not done a good job in developing death
damages law. I think that project is still ongoing and we call out a case, Bayer
versus Baxalta about a hemophilia drug, but in that case, the damages issue on
7
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appeal was whether it was proper for the plaintiff's expert to have provided a
range of proposed royalties, in fact, from 5.1% to 42.4%.Whether that was legally
operable to provide a basis for the jury's verdict, which came in at just under 18%.
Having examined that issue, the court said, yes, that seems fine. Again,
interestingly that a range, even a very broad range, could be blessed as the basis
for a subsequent award.
I will move on through a couple of other things. I would like to get, I
think, to post-grant, development in the post-grant area. I think as Marty
mentioned, we should touch on Arthrex which was decided during the past year
by the Supreme Court.
This is a case where the issue is whether under the AIA when in inter parts
review proceedings, the so-called patent trial and appeal board are the judges of
that, the administrative patent judges, whether their appointment violated the
constitution, specifically the so-called appointments clause of the constitution,
and whether the exercise of power by these administrative patent judges was
unconstitutional because it was not reviewable by a government officer, in this
case, the director of the patent trademark office appointed by the president subject
to the confirmation by the Senate.
This case had made its way up through the courts. The Federal Circuit had
found that the appointment of the APJs was unconstitutional and that the fix that
the Federal Circuit came up with was to, in essence, make the APJs removable at
will by the director, that in the words of the Supreme Court, specifically the Chief
Justice, this satisfied no one and led to some unhappy APJs and a lot of unhappy
patent applicants.
In the Supreme Court, the court did agree that the appointment of the APJs
violated the constitution and that because their actions were not reviewable, and
indeed, perhaps the structure had been put in place deliberately to make them not
reviewable by the director, and thus struck down the relevant part of the patent
law as unenforceable because it was in violation of the appointment's clause of the
constitution.
I will look forward to Marty's remarks because I'm almost out of time on
this, but my own sense is that Arthrex, while it has interesting constitutional
implications, hasn't actually made a great deal of difference in patent practice. It is
certainly true that the patent office has adopted procedures to make it possible for
the director to exercise plenary review over our decisions of the patent trial and
appeal board. As a practical matter, that review seems overwhelmingly likely to
say that the director approves of what the board has done.
Ultimately, it's not clear to me that in the big scheme of things, this made a
lot of difference to outcomes there. Maybe with that, Marty, I will finish my
highlights.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: You're right on. Perfect. Perfect. Right. On the
timing, so that's perfect. I'm just wondering, Nick, if you thought institutional
decisions also have to be reviewed?
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: I think I would say yes. I know that,
that is a vexed question and that there are currently challenges underway that have
not yet been decided on that.
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MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Comments from the panelists on all of this?
Nahoko?
NAHOKO ONO: Thank you, Nick, for a thorough presentation about US
case law. You didn't touch much, but you put that on the slides. I also agreed that
damaged cases like Omega or MLC are quite important as the Federal Circuit
tries to tackle how to determine apportionment damage awards.
I'm not sure about 101. From me, I think, a truly international perspective,
as well as in my real practice here in Cranford, although the Federal Circuit
remains confused on this issue, Supreme Court Mayo/Alice two-steps test
working clarified by the USPTO and then also its guideline, especially examples
seem working well. Then I heard from my prosecution colleagues that they
receive very few or fewer 101 rejections these days. I think this practice has
happened maybe for the last several years.
Then the third point that I'd like to make, or you didn't select this case, but
I thought that Caltech versus Broadcom case, that is very important that this is
about IPR estoppel and then Federal Circuit clarify that IPR estoppel applies to
the challenge claims and to all grounds that could have been asserted in an IPR
petition.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Other panelists?
MARJAN NOOR: Maybe I can comment on the enablement and written
description from the pharmaceutical field. That's a very, very hot topic in Europe
and the UK as well. That's because we similarly have to grapple with the idea of
patents that, for example, on antibodies are not sequences but are functionally
defined. It's very interesting because a lot of the litigation involves US companies
and the US patent counterpart, how the field views the way the world looks at
these patents and sees the US as very much the most stringent of all because you
have the written description on top of the other issues you mentioned.
I suppose I'd say that in Europe, that strictness gets less as you go through
the UK and even less as you go into the rest of Europe. For the rest of Europe,
you have the concept of whether you have serious doubts substantiated by
verifiable facts as to the possibility of whether the skilled person can carry out the
invention.
Then in the UK, you have the difficulties of knowing whether the idea is
that you have to actually be able to identify all operative embodiments within the
breadth of the claim or whether, actually, if the skilled person without undue
efforts can actually identify with one compound, whether that does satisfy the
feature, whether that's sufficiently enabled. We have those difficulties as well.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: How would you like to practice before a jury that
knows fundamentally nothing and is going to make a decision based on nothing?
You have plausibility, and you have sufficiency, and you have judges who I find
amazing.
MARJAN NOOR: Yes. Yes, they are. They have that. Yes. In fact, I
remember even as a junior lawyer looking at some of the demonstratives that go
before the jury, thinking you do have to start from the beginning. Whereas, our
judges are technically qualified. Even if they're not technically qualified in the
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pharma sector, they'll be able to understand it quicker than anyone else. Yes, we
are privileged with that.
LAURA SHERIDAN: Marty, if I could jump in, and how's my sound by
the way? Is it okay?
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: I hear you perfectly.
LAURA SHERIDAN: Okay, great. I'm sure we'll probably talk about this
more, but I did want to just briefly touch upon what Nick brought up at the outset,
which is the recent editorial. Actually, it mentioned something that I think had
some similar themes to it but didn't get the coverage, of course, because it wasn't
in the New York Times and that is rare for patent issues to be found there: that is,
the Commerce Department's strategic plan for 2022 through 2026. That came out
a few weeks ago. I think what you'll find in there are some of the things that
maybe were not so controversial about that op-ed are also echoed in the strategic
plan. It talks about the importance of reliability of patent rights. It talks about
quality and patent processing and examination and access to prior art and making
sure examiners have the time that they need to do their jobs.
I do think you're seeing the Commerce Department, just a few weeks
back, recognizing already some of these important issues and setting out goals for
the PTO, which I think, for those listening this morning, Director Vidal really
welcomed that dialogue. I think she welcomed the conversation around some of
these areas for improvement, that whatever you might think about the editorial
from this week, I think we can all look to the Commerce Department's own
strategic plan and say there's good things to work with that I expect a lot of folks
will agree strongly with.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Understand that when I hear these ideas, I know
they were old when I started to practice patent law and that's about 60 years. All
those ideas are much older than my length of career. I hear them again. We should
give time for examiners to examine and yes, of course, we should give them five
years but practically, that won't work. In around 1900 people were saying, "If they
stop issuing these crappy patents, you'll find it." I don't want to make fun of this.
But this is just very old and all the ideas in there were very old. They
started out all these things that were patented. Yes, well, did they meet all of the
tests? Well, sometimes they don't. Then they shouldn't be patented. That's why we
have courts, et cetera, to throw them out. If you can come up with one idea that
was new in that editorial, at least I will give you a horay.
LAURA SHERIDAN: I will just say, Marty, I agree these are ideas that
are not necessarily new but I think with the number of applications getting filed
every year, the number of grants at the PTO, the complexity that's been introduced
through artificial intelligence-based inventions. They may be old ideas, but they
are long overdue because it's getting urgent to address some of these things. They
are hard and I think with 9,000 examiners, it is a real challenge. I'm not intending
to say this is something that would happen overnight, but it is getting to be urgent,
given the complexity of technology and the importance of those technologies.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: How would you correct it? We have patent
offices all over the world. They're all looking at this stuff. The European Patent
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Office spends an absolute fortune examining patents, and then they have other
procedures. Tell me how you would fix the system.
LAURA SHERIDAN: I'll give one and then I'll let everybody else speak.
This is something I'm passionate about.MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Maybe more, fix it right here.
LAURA SHERIDAN: We're going to fix it today, Marty. The first big
change – and this is not an exciting one but it's critical – is moving the fee
structure upfront, so that big companies who file patent applications, instead of
paying all that money at the back end, after we've gotten a patent, we pay it at the
front end. That gives the PTO the resources it needs so that examiners have better
tools, but also more time because if we don't move that money upfront, it really
comes down to a resourcing issue where the PTO can't give more time to patent
examiners if they don't have money to do it.
What's critical here, though, is I'm not suggesting raising fees for
everybody. It has to be those parties that can afford it and that then supports the
rest of the system for those entrepreneurs and inventors who can't. There are
plenty of large filers who have the means to take their maintenance fees and pay
those upfront more like Europe. That's one idea.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: That may well work. You'd have to program it
out.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: Marty, that is evocative of one of the
things that's in the New York Times article which talks about a sliding scale in
which wealthy applicants pay a lot more than small applicants. It's not just a
binary system.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: We have that but maybe not-NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: Well, you have a small entity system,
but it's talking about a sliding scale, where that is where the fees are proportional
to the resources of the applicant which I think, aligns with what Laura was just
talking about.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Any other comment? Go ahead.
CAREY R. RAMOS: I agree with Marty, my personal recollection doesn't
go back to the '60s but it goes back to the '70s. In the patent area, it's a pendulum,
because it swings back and forth. Periodically, there's a call to adjust it one way or
the other. The one thing that has changed, that I think the New York Times doesn't
take account of and Marty touched on this, is that there now are international
issues with regard to this.
If the US adjusts in one direction, and Europe moves in another direction,
then you're going to have inconsistencies on a global scale. For many of these
inventions, they are used worldwide. They're also considerations for US
competitiveness in protecting inventions, by inventors in the United States and
also promoting development of inventions and new discoveries. So it becomes an
extraordinarily complex problem of trying to get the balance right.
Of course, here in the United States, you don't have a single person who's
able to make up the rules. You have the patent trademark office. You have
Congress. You have the Supreme Court. You have the judiciary trying to
understand the Supreme Court. I tend to think that over time, we find our way
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through these paths. No one could quarrel with additional resources for the patent
office, upfront fees. I would agree with Laura. I think that makes an enormous
amount of sense.
Just having the resources to do the thorough review of patents that they
warrant particularly with some of the incredibly complicated technologies we're
seeing both in the life sciences area and in the computer area. These are just
incredibly complicated. Many of them are incredibly complicated and warrant
more careful study. So I guess I also come out somewhere in the middle.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Well, the only thing I worry about with Laura's
argument is there is no limit. We could have the perfect patent office, and we'd all
be working there and we'd be studying each application in incredible details, that
would be a couple of year's work and nobody else in Washington would be doing
anything else, which might be a healthy thing for the rest of society. There has to
be a balance.
I think everybody would agree with that, and may be shifting more fees up
to filing rather than maintenance fees. Make sense. Giving examiners more time,
but there's a limit. There's a limit to how much time you want to spend. That's the
function of post-grant proceedings or in the pharmaceutical space they litigate
them before judges without juries in Hatch Waxman proceed.
MARJAN NOOR: I think the same if you can have a perfect system, but
for the biggest selling products and the most valuable ones, you're always going
to have litigation of even a perfect system. Then the leveler is at the court's stage.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: That's what you have to have.
MARJAN NOOR: Right now what you see when you were talking about
global companies and for example, a wish to maybe have settlement, you have a
very different approach for US settlement versus the rest of the world, or at least
European settlement because the differences in the law that currently exists. The
real leveler should be set at the court stage.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Is it the law or is it the use of juries so that you
can get billion-dollar verdicts?
MARJAN NOOR: Well, I suppose in the pharmaceutical sector, it
depends. You can have more predictability sometimes if you're a pharma
company, for example, because if it's not a jury trial, then you're just dependent on
the law and I suppose the judge rather than the unpredictability of where the jury
is going to go.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: I'm not so sure that I think that juries
are such a terrible idea.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: You see, he is a trial lawyer. The trial lawyer
will always argue that he can confuse juries better than anybody else. That is in
the tradition of great trial lawyers in the United States and Nick is one of them.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: What you're saying is good for
business, Marty. I was involved with a program, we would bring a bunch of
lawyers from Europe and a bunch of lawyers from the US together and put them
in a room and have them talk about one another's systems. I would always ask
them who think it's a bad idea to have juries in all Europeans to raise their hands.
Then I said now, of those ones who have your hands up, how many of you have
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ever had a decision by a judge that you thought was completely wrong? All the
same ones had their hands up. You got the reasoning with it. You don't like the
reasoning but you got it. We've all been in that situation.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: No, Nick. That's not right. I've been before
juries in about 50 cases. The lawyers know this is a nutty system. Everybody
knows it's a nutty system. Now, if you are better at convincing jurors, more power
to you but don't tell me that our juries can equal Richard Arnold. You might not
agree with his opinions but when you read his opinions, you know nobody's
fooling him. You don't know that from a jury verdict.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: I'm not going to quarrel with Lord
Justice Arnold's powers of reasoning for political reasons.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: You may be reading more than you want.
MARJAN NOOR: I think you might end up being frustrated. You might
be frustrated by the end result, and even think the application of the law was
wrong if you're on the losing side, especially, but you rarely think they
misunderstood the science or the facts.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: You may get more science from him that you
want, but that's a different issue.
[laughter]
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: Let me throw out a question here,
which we touched on a bit. Who thinks that there should be limits on continuation
practice in the US?
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: It's a good question.
LAURA SHERIDAN: I can respond. I think the first limit I'd put into
place is on just the request for continued examination, which isn't a true
continuation. That's a separate-MARTIN J. ADELMAN: It's the same thing, though?
LAURA SHERIDAN: It can be, but I think there's a distinction. I think
what I'd like to see end is, frankly, just get rid of this ability to have a request to
continue examination. It's just a fiction, you just pay money and then do the same
thing.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: You keep going.
LAURA SHERIDAN: Yes, and it's one of those things that I think if we
just put a closing moment on prosecution, where at that point, you either appeal,
you abandon, there's some finality to it. I think that's the low hanging fruit. I think
the continuation question, I do think it's abused. If you look at the patent office's
view of it, they think there's too much of it as well. Continuations are just a way
to never let something die if you have the resources to do it, but the low hanging
fruit, I think, is around the ability to just have an examination of one patent go on
forever as long as you can afford to have it go on.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Of course, you're eating up your time?
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: You are, but-LAURA SHERIDAN: That's fair.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: What if we doubled the fees for each
successive continuation?
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MARJAN NOOR: I think the limitation on the period is the thing that's
going to be the better check because in Europe, you have divisionals arising way
down the line, you can revoke one patent, or you can have certainty, or a company
can have certainty, and a divisional is raised against them. Especially, in the
system like Germany, where you don't have your infringement and your
revocation action at the same time, then you're at the mercy of the patentee if
you're a defendant, so it causes that uncertainty.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Here, you do that, but your time limit is based
on the original filing date. If you're filing a real continuation, then your 20 year
period is being eaten up?
MARJAN NOOR: It's the same in Europe, but I thought Laura was
mentioning that the filing of your divisional would stop at a certain point in time.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Yes.
MARJAN NOOR: In the Europe, you had a system where at one stage,
you had to do it within 24 months, and so you have at least a certain amount of
predictability as a third party as to when that divisional is going to go to grant,
even though the end date will be the same.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Sure. That probably could be done. You could
limit it in some way.
MARJAN NOOR: But on the antitrust side, the commission is now
looking into divisional as a potential antitrust. Going back to Nick's comment on
competition issues.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Now, why would it be an antitrust violation? I'm
assuming I file a patent application, and these divisional or continuations, it's still
just more prosecution. I'm still not able to get a different claim that I'm entitled to?
MARJAN NOOR: No, it's the use of them. The majority thinking is that
no, divisional is a perfectly acceptable tool and patent filing practices, but the
Commission's case against the Teva divisional is more concerned with whether
you're using divisional in an anti competitive way, rather than just the mere fact
that they exist and you've filed them. I think my understanding was, your patent
thickets are just having those patents could be anti competitive.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: So that would be the thicket theory?
MARJAN NOOR: Yes.
CAREY R. RAMOS: I must say, and then Nick had touched upon this, the
argument that amassing too many patents could be an antitrust violation. That just
seems to me to be truly perverse.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: No, it's nuts. It's crazy.
CAREY R. RAMOS: To go back to what he was saying early this
morning, that there has to be some constitutional limit on that. We do have a
patent and copyright clause, and the idea that if you're really brilliant, and you get
loads of patents, that you're going to be punished for that. Particularly, with the
current antitrust division taking the view to section two monopolization can be the
basis for a criminal case, I find it really distressing. The more the antitrust
regulatory agencies get into these sorts of practices, the more troubling I find all
of this. My take anyway.
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MARJAN NOOR: Someone in the audience has just mentioned that, what
about stopping drafting new claims that read on to existing products, and that's a
typical thing that you could say. It starts bordering on to the anti-competitive, is
when you take the benefit of your own earlier priority date, read on to a
competitor's product with a new claim as part of a divisional.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: That I’m entitled to? Or I’m not entitled to?
[crosstalk]
MARJAN NOOR: You're entitled–
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: I'm entitled to that? That I really made that
invention, but I didn't claim it before, and then I see somebody using something,
say, "I did that. I didn't claim it before." I haven't abandoned my case. I want those
people to pay, I'm entitled to it. Perfectly legal, what's antitrust about that?
LAURA SHERIDAN: Marty, not from an antitrust perspective, but just
from the way it plays out in the software industry, is you do have continuations
that are filed to specifically cover things that come 15 years down the line on
technologies that were never contemplated, and the issue is, again, going back to
the patent office and why they need more money. It's 112. It's the claims that are
being pursued in these continuations are often so far afield from what was
originally filed, what was contemplated, and just stronger enforcement of the
basics, which again, I think the statute exists. It just needs to be enforced so that
the claims are actually about what was invented, not about gamesmanship 20
years later.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: I think everybody would agree with that. How
could you not agree with that? You laid in your claims 15 years later, to claim
something you didn't invent, and to blow smoke and get something by the
examiner is really bad. Marjan, I thought your hypo was, it was clearly disclosed.
They didn't claim it, but it was clearly disclosed, boom, now they throw a claim
in.
CAREY R. RAMOS: Marty, with respect to this particular issue, claiming
something that you really didn't invent years later, I just don't think we need
anti-trust law to accomplish that.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: No.
CAREY R. RAMOS: Exactly.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: The English will throw that out quickly.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: As George mentioned in the chat, the
late claiming doctrine used to serve that function. You had two years and then you
couldn't write a broader claim, right?
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Well, we could have that too.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: Right.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Yes. You could say, fundamentally, figure out
what you invented by a certain time, or a late claiming doctrine, yes. We don't
have it. We could have something like that.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: We used to.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Yes, we could have something like that, and
that's not unreasonable. I don't know how often that happens. Now, this is a
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question I was going to ask you on these antibodies. What was the invention in
Amgen? Nobody talks about that. What the hell did they invent?
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: The invention is the use of an antibody
to bind a protein called PCS K9 that-MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Which was old.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: Sorry?
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Which the oldest idea, 2003, that invention was
made much earlier.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: I'm not so sure about that.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: 2003.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: If you look at the Amgen patents that
are in that case, they're pretty extensive disclosures by the standards of their day.
There's a lot in there, there's X-ray crystallography, there is at least some
structure-function. To me, it was always hard. I think what it boils down to is to
what extent do we permit functional claiming in the biotech area because it's hard
to imagine a disclosure that would be qualitatively better than those but that still
doesn't get you to the huge gulf of does that mean I'm entitled to a patent on any
antibody that will perform the same biological function and that's ultimately what
the fight is about.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: The idea of using an antibody to manipulate
PCS K9 certainly was older, obviously.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: I don't know enough about the field to
know that butMARTIN J. ADELMAN: Believe me.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: These things, they go back fairly far
toward the origin of that board.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Not that far. I looked at it, the earliest they could
have was 2007 that was[crosstalk]
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: Yes, 2007.
[crosstalk]
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Lots known by that time. I was trying to-- They
came up with an antibody that works but how broad were they intact?
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: Well, that's the central question, that if
you invent does the fact of showing that it's possible for an antibody toMARTIN J. ADELMAN: It was obviously possible. That's what they
came up with.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: That would be as you just said,
obvious.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Obvious. That's what antibodies are for.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: Note section 112, let me throw out this,
what happens to the law when, thanks to Laura and her colleagues, the computing
power advances to the point that we can predict structure-function relationships
for antibodies? Does this entire body of law then collapse? Stumped everyone, see
everyone is stunned into silence.
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MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Let Laura answer that. She's going to wipe out
all patenting in the biotech area, and you're going to retire. Fortunately, it won't
happen for a while.
LAURA SHERIDAN: I have no opinion on antibody law, I'd turn to
someone else for that, I'm a tech person.
MARJAN NOOR: I don't think computers structure-function, you can get
to the point where like in a small molecule, a computer will be able to say if it's
got a halogen on it or something, do X or it will have this function or if it's got
something else, it'll have this function but a computer would never be able to
well, [laughs] we hope, won't be able to get to the point where the underlying
biological mechanisms all go.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: All out of work and Nick will retire.
MARJAN NOOR: By the way, you don't put the computers as the
inventor, you put the person who wrote the program and then you're all right in a
lot of countries.
CAREY R. RAMOS: Nick and Marty just touched upon in obviousness. I
don't think any of the cases, Nick, that you were viewed turned on obviousness? I
suppose one way of addressing the New York Times' is concerns is a more robust
application of obviousness by the courts. Although it is one of those concepts that,
in the eye of the beholder, but often I think for those of us who practice in this
field we have this reaction. "Oh, come on, that's obvious but again, it's tricky
when it's applied by the courts.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: Carey, there's a policy issue which is
how much money do I want to spend upfront on patterns? When I understand that
most of them will be economic dead ends that nothing will ever come with them
so where do I turn the dial between spending the society's resources on making
litigation give more reliable outcomes, as opposed to spending the resources on
having high-quality patents, many of which are meaningless. I think there's no
right answer to that. It's just a question that a lot of these issues are spawned by
the fact that this, particularly in the US system has high transactional costs when
you have to go to court. If you can take-MARTIN J. ADELMAN: What if you didn't have juries?
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: [laughs] I'm sensing a theme here,
Marty.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Well, there is a theme. It's nuts and the whole
trend of modern developments, for example, Hatch Waxman litigation, is to get
rid of juries. The irony is that is the effect of the America Invents Act, because the
PTAB gets rid of juries, now we have a current fight, whether the director can
have a discretionary denial.
NAHOKO ONO: Even if you remove jury system, there are many judges
who make wrong decisions too.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Judges will make, even the brilliant English
judges are occasionally wrong. They might be misled by brilliant lawyers.
LAURA SHERIDAN: I think this is why we may have different
characterizations of the AIA, Marty. I view it as a chance for the PTO to correct
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its own errors. It's an agency function so that they can fix something that went
wrong on the front end and I view it as-MARTIN J. ADELMAN: We don't disagree. That's why you eliminate the
jury.
LAURA SHERIDAN: I am not saying that. I think the issueMARTIN J. ADELMAN: Look at it, historically, once a patent was issued,
I had a right to litigate that before a jury if I got a patent.
LAURA SHERIDAN: Well, I'm saying that I don't think post-grant review
changes that. What it does[crosstalk]
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: It eliminates a lot of validity issues.
LAURA SHERIDAN: It does.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: So that solves a lot of damages.
LAURA SHERIDAN: It streamlines a lot of issues in a way that's a lot
more cost-effective. It can streamline things with respect to which claims might
be ultimately asserted at trial.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: I am with you.
LAURA SHERIDAN: It's not eliminating the proceeding, the jury trial
itself.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: It just did. Don't you know how litigation
works? When I started practice, if you filed a case for patent infringement, there
was validity and infringement and damages. Now, you might have infringement
before the jury but validity is eliminated and that was part of-LAURA SHERIDAN: To be quite honest validity is still happening when
courts are refusing to stay litigation pending PTO review, which should be
happening. That is something that the validity is proceeding apace.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: I think that will go away. I will bet you that will
go away.
LAURA SHERIDAN: I'll take that bet. I like that.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: I'm almost certain it'll go away and in fact, if
you look at the statistics, it almost has gone away. Recent statistics.
CAREY R. RAMOS: Further limitations on jury trials is going to butt up
against the Constitution. However, and any effort to try to amend the Constitution,
these days is tough.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: No. You're not going to amend the Constitution.
Stop, don't talk about it but where will there be jury trials if you have PTAB and
real issues of validity, if you have Hatch Waxman and small molecule
pharmaceutical patents, Juries will be for infringement which often is not the
issue and damages. That may be okay. If you were designing a system, you might
be okay with juries for damages. That's something they can understand.
CAREY R. RAMOS: Although, if you allow the experts to give the jury a
broad range. [laughs]
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: That's a problem but judges can cut them out.
CAREY R. RAMOS: That's an invitation to steal. That's also an invitation
to Waco, Texas.
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MARTIN J. ADELMAN: That's another issue. That could be worked on
by the experts. They'd be around even for judges.
[silence]
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: So this has been a lot of fun. I think we're about
at the end of the line. I don't see a clock anymore which might mean that we've
overstayed our welcome. I want to thank everybody. This has been a lot of fun. I
hope you all enjoyed it. Maybe we learned something. Nick, particularly, thanks
for laying all of that stuff out. You did Dimitrios proud.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: I'll join him in happy retirement. I'm
taking your advice.
MARTIN J. ADELMAN: Bye, everyone.
NICHOLAS P. GROOMBRIDGE: So long. Bye.
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